Page Denied

Address by Admiral Stansfield Turner
Director of Central Intelligence
APEX Contract Officers
6 October 1980

Good afternoon. Appreciate your all being here for this whole day of
activity. For this chance for all of us to get together and make sure we are heading
in the same, and what I think is a very important direction. APEX is very likely
the most significant change in the way we handle compartmented information that has
taken place in any of our careers. It is a fundamental change both philosophically
and mechanically. It is certainly intended to do a great deal to improve our security,
but whether it does or not is going to be much a function of how well it is implemented
which is of course why we are here together because you are going to have to do so
much to get it off on the right start and then keep it going in the right direction.

Let me philosophize with you for a moment though and tell you how all this
came about. It really started just a little more than 2 years ago when all the
program managers of the intelligence community and I spent a weekend or I guess it
was a Friday afternoon and evening and Saturday morning out of town getting away
from the telephones and sitting down and going over a number of philosophical issues
about the status of the intelligence community. We here at the Agency just before
that had just had the Kampiles case and security was very much on our minds. In
the evening I raised with the community leaders this issue of what could we do.
I wasn't making excuses for the Kampiles case which was entirely our fault here at
the Agency and was wrong. But I will say that in the year and a half that I had
been here before the Kampiles case I had been very disturbed at what I considered
to be the lack of attention to security throughout the community and had taken a
number of steps to try to tighten up here and try to tighten up there. A great deal
of the problem in my mind was inattentativeness on the part of individuals to the
basic rules, the basic cautions, the fundamentals even of need-to-know. Then as I

asked why that had happened, why over the years ! d we grown so sloppy, it seemed to

me that there were several things that came out of this discussion with the community leaders.

One, as we asked each other questions, we found out that we the leaders of

the community could not explain all of the compartments that we had. We could not

explain why they were there and just what went into one and where the boundary was to

the next. I asked myself, if we can't understand that how do all the people who operate

this. Maybe our secretaries all understand it and keep us out of trouble. But it didn't

seem to me it was healthy to have so many compartments that we could not understand them.

It seemed to me we also had so much information that was in these compartments that we

were forced to treat it casually. It seemed to us that the system had grown up topsy

turvy over four decades. It hadn't been a single centralized compartmentation system,

special compartmented intelligence system it was several different systems with

different rules and they weren't well coordinated and it was difficult to understand

how they related to each other. As a result of that meeting and the consternation

all of us felt afterwards, I asked retired General Johnny Vogt, United States Air Force

to sit down with a small group of people and start with a clean slate and ask what

kind of a system could we best construct and then ask ourselves could we transition to

it reasonably. I asked him to see what he could do to simplify the compartmentation

system, to see what he could do to downgrade and get material out of the compartmented

system so that more people would have access to it but so at the same time there would

be less information we had to keep compartmented controls over; to see how we could

strengthen emphasis on need-to-know and how we could strengthen the barriers between

compartments, so that we could truly keep things in their compartments when it really

needed to be that way. I think General Vogt did the community and the country a

tremendous service in the report that he prepared. He asked me for three months, I gave

him one and he came back in one. We then turned it over to a National Foreign Intelligence

Board working group, who ground around on it for a very long time, a lot more than a month.

Almost a year. But it was worthwhile because they came up with a single community wide system. It does, as I think you know emphasize maximum dissemination. It would have been easy for General Vogt and his group and the NFIB working group because the emphasis was on security, to have constructed a system that would have tightened all the screws, made it difficult for you and me to do our daily business and therefore of course invited violation, or disrespect and ignoring of a new system. We have really tried to recognize that our business in intelligence is promulgating information. It doesn't do the country any good if it is all bound up in a few peoples minds and hands. So, we have in the APEX system great emphasis on getting as much out of compartmentation as we can and of developing a mechanism for the best distribution of what remains in the compartmented system. For instance, building these strong barriers between the compartments that tell you how our systems operate and those compartments that tell you what the systems learn. You know the features of the APEX, I don't need to rehearse them for you, but I do think I would like to emphasize that with this new system of where we separate those who have full access to the sources and the methods by which we gain intelligence and those who have access only to the product of compartmented material that we can do away with the need for limitations or ceilings on billets for different agencies. I instituted those in 1977 because of my concern for the carelessness with which we were handling some of these materials. They have been a pain to me and a pain to you. If you, or your agencies handle the institution of APEX well and don't just go for the moon in the numbers of operational compartments, product compartments that you assign to your staffs I see no need to have formal billet ceilings. We should be able to break this down into those who really need these different kinds of compartments.

I see a significant reduction in this system in the volume of material in the codeword systems. If everything is classified, nothing is classified, obviously. We have a real opportunity to tighten up and put into our compartmented systems only those things which truly do need to be there. You and I know from our years in the

3

government that one of our great sins is over classification. It is so easy to do.
It seems to cost so little, and it does cost very little and it is easy to be careful
you do not err on the side of being too generous in putting a lower classification on
things. It is the summation of each of our doing that that causes the problem that
makes the system loose respect. I really hope that one of the products we will have
from this new system, from this emphasis on removing from the compartment is much
more dissemination of very vital material to our operational military commanders
and their staffs and their operational sub-units in the field. We have come in the
intelligence world of our country to where the national systems which we operate on
a national basis and from which much of the compartmented information is derived
have tremendous value to those who are out there in the field and don't have a whole
string of clearances behind their name because they are in operational billets and
exposed to dangerous positions and so on.

I think we need very much to ensure that we find ways not after the war
begins, but before the war begins to get them as much of our highly sensitive
information as we can and I believe that through this combination of balancing
of clearances and procedures that we are working on in APEX that we can do better
in that field and it is vital that we do so and do so before the balloon goes up.
I know I am talking in generalities and that you are here wondering about the problems
that you are going to face with your contractors and the costs they are going to charge
to us for doing this. I cannot give you an easy answer on it, I do sincerely believe
it is worth the cost. If there is one conviction I have derived in my 3 1/2 years
in the intelligence community, it is that leaks our reputation as a community as a country
for not being able to keep the lid on our secrets is the greatest inhibitor to
continued good intelligence performance for this country in the decades ahead. I don't
think we have yet come close to feeling the impact that this growing reputation that
we have as a community and as a country will have on our overall intelligence
quality and capabilities in the years ahead. WE have got to be willing to pay some
costs. Cost to contractors, cost to you and me and the way we go about our daily business
if we are going to tighten up. You know and I know that a lot of the worse leaks

that we are concerned with do not come from you and me here in the intelligence community. I am proud of our performance. I think we are better than many other elements of the government in keeping our secrets. We know why. We know how important it is. But, there is no way we can call the kettle black and stand back and pretend we don't have to play our share in it. Instituting this system, making our whole awareness of security much more elevated is part of that. We can't solve all the problems in the rest of the Executive Branch, we can't solve all the problems on the Hill for the prying media. But we can do our damndest is our own house and unless we do there is no way we deserve to go out and run the campaigns we are running to get others to play their part of the role.

Unquestionably there will be man-hours costs that contractors can legitimately attribute to this. They won't be insignificant and it is not going to be easy to find the money for them, but I would suggest two things. The better you know and understand the system the mechanics, the better you can supervise their installation of APEX and make sure we are charged what is proper for us to be charged and not more. Secondly, I would suggest that in our own house and in the contractors houses, I already see many costs being charged to APEX that do not properly belong to APEX in my opinion. They belong to whatever you call the present systems. In short, what people run up the bill for APEX, whether it is in CIA or DIA, or General Dynamics or where, they are starting from where they are today, which is not complying with the regulations which we have in many cases. They are going to where they have to be with APEX, but only part of that is really APEX and I don't think we should be charged for what people are not doing that they are required to do today, but through our inattention to this they have been able to fluff off and cut corners on. Let me only say then, in conclusion, I sincerely believe that tightening our security is the most important thing that needs to be done to ensure the long term vitality capability of our intelligence community. We have made a major investment, a major commitment to the APEX system, there is no turning back at this point, we are up to our armpits in it, maybe it is our ears - but its there.

5

Seriously, it is a revolutionary but important step. It is one that we would have tried from the beginning had we had the opportunity but our systems came in increments, our present security procedures were built in increments, we think now that we have here a foundation which will absorb new systems, new capabilities as they come along in the future without having to go back and start the novo again as we almost have in this case. But it is you, your understanding of the system, your enthusiasm for installing it, your attention to the details and your working closely particularly with the contractors in helping them to understand it also and to recognize that one of the benefits over the long run for them will be reduced costs. I want you to keep that very much in mind as you deal with them because where they have several manuals, several different procedures for virtually the same thing they are in due course with APEX going to have a single standardized system that will be of considerable value to them.

There is lots to be gained, there is a great deal to be done to get there. I appreciate what you are doing and what you will do for it.

Thank you very much.